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European Central Bank working paper series 38Abstract 
 It is commonly thought that an open economy can accommodate output
shocks through either exchange rate or real sector adjustments. We formalise this
notion by incorporating labour market rigidities into an “escape clause” model of
currency crises. We show that the absence of structural reform makes a currency peg
more fragile and undermines the credibility of the monetary authority in a dynamic
setting. The fragility is captured by a devaluation premium in expectations that
increases the average inflation rate when the currency peg is more vulnerable to “busts”
than “booms”. This interaction between macroeconomic and microeconomic rigidities
suggests that a policy reform can only be consistent if it renders either exchange rates
or labour markets flexible.
Keywords: exchange rate policy, labour market flexibility, structural reform
JEL Classification: E42, F33, D84.
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The analysis of the role of microconomic rigidities in generating macroeconomic
distortions has developed to an influential literature. In particular, issues related to
wage- and price-setting are in the core of analyses that have contributed to the
understanding of why some economies are more resilient to shocks than others, why
shocks sometimes produce persistent effects in employment, output and inflation, and
why different policies might have different effects over different horizons.
          Resilience of the economy is particularly important in the context of policy rules
that take the form of target ranges for some key variables, such as inflation or the
exchange rate. If the structure of the economy gives raise to stickiness and persistence,
the adverse effects of repeated shocks might accumulate over time and complicate the
task of the policymaker in keeping the target variable within the pre-specified band.
Structural rigidities are seldom the immediate reason to acute policy problems, such as
periods of high inflation or currency crises, but by slowing down the economy’s
reversal back to trend developments they increase the economy’s vulnerability to
distortions that are triggered by adverse supply and demand shocks, falling confidence,
speculative attacks or contagion from other related crises. This indirect effect also
means that it is difficult to measure the role of persistence per se as a factor behind
currency crises, for example; the impact of structural rigidities typically comes about
via the interplay with the various shocks in the dynamic context.
         Our paper provides a novel contribution to the theoretical literature of currency
crises in that we consider a Lucas-type supply curve that incorporates unemployment
persistence as an explicit argument. In the past literature such persistence, or hysteresis,
has been commonly modelled as arising from the relationship between employment and
insider status (see in particular Lindbaeck and Snower, 1986). The key to the
microfoundations of this kind is the fundamental asymmetry in the wage-setting
process between insiders who are employed and outsiders who want jobs. In spite of
the presence of outsiders, unionized wage-bargaining structure tends to yield nominal
wages that are chosen with a view of providing employment for the insiders. In a
dynamic context, adverse shocks that contribute to reduced employment change the
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November 2004number of insiders, lower the next period’s employment target and alter the subsequent
wage rate, giving rise to hysteresis. Membership considerations can thus explain the
general tendency of the equilibrium unemployment rate to follow the actual
unemployment rate. The argument that the distortions in the labour market originate
from wage setting process where a trade union selects an employment target that
consists only of current union membership has been provided as one explanation to the
persistence of the European unemployment (see for example Blanchard and Summers,
1986, Lockwood and Philippopoulos, 1994, Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).  Indeed,
empirical work on trade union membership suggests that membership is not fixed over
time, but responds strongly to changes in past employment.
          In an empirically relevant context, the institutional set-up for the exchange rate
regime should allow for both revaluations and devaluations. We show that such a
structure gives raise to a devaluation premium in expectations that interacts with
shocks, rigidities and preferences; it is the richness of these potential interactions that is
the driving force of our analysis. For example, while a “conservative” policymaker is
generally seen as a more beneficial in an environment characterised by nominal
rigidities, we demonstrate how in a dynamic context structural reform really is the only
sustainable way to improve the economy’s resilience to shocks and hence the
credibility of the exchange rate peg.
          In a setting where insider-outsider considerations generate micro-level rigidities
in the employment process, it is important to realize that discretionary macroeconomic
policy measures not only affect current employment, but also future employment.
Rational policymakers will take into account these future effects on current policy
when pursuing their policy targets. The model below will highlight the particular
repercussions of such dynamics in the context of a fixed exchange rate regime.
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A pegged exchange rate is nowadays seldom seen as a permanently sustainable
exchange rate regime. There is general acceptance of the proposition, first articulated
by Milton Friedman in 1953, that a currency has either to be fixed irrevocably to
another – be in effect the same currency – or float freely on the foreign exchanges. But
a currency peg has in recent years quite often been adopted as a temporary, deliberately
transitional, arrangement. A common reason for so doing is that it is a form of
commitment by the adopting country’s monetary authorities. Once they have
announced the peg, their actions must be concentrated on maintaining it, and, as a
consequence of doing so, they will import the monetary policy of whichever country
issues the currency to which they have pegged.
This has been done by developed and less developed countries, and in most
parts of the world. The UK, for example, pegged its exchange rate when, under the
governments of Mrs. Thatcher, various approaches to monetary control had been tried
and failed  (an entertaining and well referenced account of this period can be found in
Lawson, 1992). Britain joined the ERM and monetary policy was, so to speak,
imported from Germany because a better one was produced there than seemed at that
time to be capable of being produced at home. But other countries have adopted a
currency peg as part of a more wide-ranging set of policy reforms. Often there has been
prior to the pegging of the currency neither monetary nor fiscal discipline. Sometimes,
too, there has been very limited political stability; in some cases the peg has been part
of a policy reform in which a civilian government replaced a military one. More
recently, three of the ten countries that joined the European Union in May 2004 have
entered the ERM II as a transitory step towards a membership of the EMU.
At the same time as changes in exchange rate regimes are implemented, tax
structures, tariffs, product market regulation, and labour market regulation are often all
up for discussion. Changes to these aspects of the economy affect its microeconomic
structure. The changes can increase or reduce what is often called the “flexibility of the
economy” – a phrase which can be made operational if it is interpreted as meaning the
persistence of the economy’s response to shocks.
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mutually consistent – that is to say, if one set neither undermines the effectiveness of
the other nor threatens its durability. This paper examines a particular issue prompted
by that observation. It is shown that structural reforms – labour market reforms in
particular – which reduce the persistence of the effect of shocks make an exchange rate
peg more robust, and therefore more credible. This in turn means that the benefits of
pegging – a lower risk premium on interest rates, for example – come more quickly. In
turn, the microeconomic reforms are themselves then made more durable by the
robustness of the peg, for they are not threatened by the political turmoil that can
follow the collapse of an exchange rate commitment.
1
To analyse the effects of structural rigidity on fixed exchange rate regimes, we
build on the literature that focuses on the interaction between government and the
private sector expectations in a macroeconomic game. Extending the closed-economy
framework by Barro and Gordon (1983), Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994) studied
output persistence that has its microfoundations in the insider-outsider dynamics that is
characteristic for corporatist wage-setting. Other contributions that are crucial for our
model set-up are Obstfeld (1994, 1996, 1997) who modified the Barro-Gordon closed-
economy policy framework by adding exchange rate pegs with escape clauses to
analyse the occurrence of speculative attacks in the context of multiple equilibria. In a
one-sided escape clause model that rules out revaluations, Drazen and Masson (1994)
and Jeanne (1999) looked at the impacts of output persistence on the sustainability of
an exchange rate regime and showed how persistence affects the policymaker’s
incentives to devalue by a fixed size in a two-period model. In contrast to these latter
contributions, we build on the work by Obstfeld (1996) and Castrén and Takalo (2000)
and incorporate structural rigidities in a two-sided escape clause setting where both
devaluations and revaluations are possible. This choice of modelling makes our
framework fully dynamic and allows for smooth exchange rate adjustments. It also
gives raise to an explicit devaluation premium in expectations as a result of asymmetric
costs associated with devaluations and revaluations. The equilibrium clearly highlights
                                                          
1 It should be noted at this point that although the collapse of Britain’s exchange rate peg seems
inconsistent with this, the opposite can be argued.  The policy came under pressure, and was abandoned,
after it had achieved its objective of delivering low and stable inflation.  The collapse had as much to do
with the politics of the time, on which again see Lawson (1992), as with the economics.
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as shocks that are not stabilised accumulate over time.
2
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of insider-outsider
dynamics as a source of structural rigidities and the relative importance such rigidities
for the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policies in a stochastic environment.
After presenting our model and key results in sections 3 and 4 we illustrate in section 5
the predictions of the model in the light of two historical episodes. First, the economic
and financial turbulence in Finland in the early 1990s provides an apt example of the
hazards of fixed currency regimes in the absence of structural reforms that contribute to
the economy’s resilience to shocks. Second, in more general terms, we discuss the need
for consistent reforms against the background of problems associated with insufficient
sequencing of reforms in the developing countries.
2. Motivation
The analysis of the role of microconomic rigidities in generating macroeconomic
distortions has developed to an influential literature. In particular, issues related to
wage- and price-setting are in the core of analyses that have contributed to the
understanding of why some economies are more resilient to shocks than others, why
shocks sometimes produce persistent effects in employment, output and inflation, and
why different policies might have different effects over different horizons.
          Resilience of the economy is particularly important in the context of policy rules
that take the form of target ranges for some key variables, such as inflation or the
exchange rate. If the structure of the economy gives raise to stickiness and persistence,
the adverse effects of repeated shocks might accumulate over time and complicate the
task of the policymaker in keeping the target variable within the pre-specified band.
Structural rigidities are seldom the immediate reason to acute policy problems, such as
periods of high inflation or currency crises, but by slowing down the economy’s
reversal back to trend developments they increase the economy’s vulnerability to
                                                          
2 In a somewhat related study, Irwin (2004) emphasised the incomplete information about the cost of
devaluation in determining the credibility of a currency board.
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speculative attacks or contagion from other related crises. This indirect effect also
means that it is difficult to measure the role of persistence per se as a factor behind
currency crises, for example; the impact of structural rigidities typically comes about
via the interplay with the various shocks in the dynamic context.
         Our paper provides a novel contribution to the theoretical literature of currency
crises in that we consider a Lucas-type supply curve that incorporates unemployment
persistence as an explicit argument. In the past literature such persistence, or hysteresis,
has been commonly modelled as arising from the relationship between employment and
insider status (see in particular Lindbaeck and Snower, 1986). The key to the
microfoundations of this kind is the fundamental asymmetry in the wage-setting
process between insiders who are employed and outsiders who want jobs. In spite of
the presence of outsiders, unionized wage-bargaining structure tends to yield nominal
wages that are chosen with a view of providing employment for the insiders. In a
dynamic context, adverse shocks that contribute to reduced employment change the
number of insiders, lower the next period’s employment target and alter the subsequent
wage rate, giving rise to hysteresis. Membership considerations can thus explain the
general tendency of the equilibrium unemployment rate to follow the actual
unemployment rate. The argument that the distortions in the labour market originate
from wage setting process where a trade union selects an employment target that
consists only of current union membership has been provided as one explanation to the
persistence of the European unemployment (see for example Blanchard and Summers,
1986, Lockwood and Philippopoulos, 1994, Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).  Indeed,
empirical work on trade union membership suggests that membership is not fixed over
time, but responds strongly to changes in past employment.
          In an empirically relevant context, the institutional set-up for the exchange rate
regime should allow for both revaluations and devaluations. We show that such a
structure gives raise to a devaluation premium in expectations that interacts with
shocks, rigidities and preferences; it is the richness of these potential interactions that is
the driving force of our analysis. For example, while a “conservative” policymaker is
generally seen as a more beneficial in an environment characterised by nominal
10
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November 2004rigidities, we demonstrate how in a dynamic context structural reform really is the only
sustainable way to improve the economy’s resilience to shocks and hence the
credibility of the exchange rate peg.
          In a setting where insider-outsider considerations generate micro-level rigidities
in the employment process, it is important to realize that discretionary macroeconomic
policy measures not only affect current employment, but also future employment.
Rational policymakers will take into account these future effects on current policy
when pursuing their policy targets. The model below will highlight the particular
repercussions of such dynamics in the context of a fixed exchange rate regime.
3. The Model
3.1. The set-up
We consider an infinite horizon, discrete time economy, where the macroeconomic
equilibrium is described by interaction between the private sector and the policymaker,
who controls inflation rate and, under the assumption that purchasing power parity
(PPP) holds, the exchange rate. Following Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994), it is
assumed that the economy is characterised by labour market rigidities that, in turn, give
raise to output persistence. As is typical for models with macroeconomic policy
interactions, the trade union sets the nominal wage Wt while the policymaker controls
the price level Pt. In every period t, the demand for labour in the economy is
determined by the real wage Wt/Pt as Lt=(Wt/Pt)
-e. Taking logs and setting e=1 for
convenience, this can be written as:
t t t
d
t z w p l + − = ,( 1 )
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d
t l  is the log of employment,  t p  is the log of the price level,  t w  is the log of the
nominal wage and  t z  is a log of stochastic output shock uniformly distributed on [-Z/2,
Z/2].
3
Workers are organised in a trade union which sets one-period wages before the




t t t t l l E U − − = − (2)
where  t lˆ  is the log of period t employment target of the union. We assume that the
target is a weighted average of the currently employed insiders ( 1 − t l ) and the total
labour force (
s
t l ). For simplicity, we fix the total labour force in the economy so that lt
s
= l
s. Then, the union's target rate of employment can be re-expressed as
()
s
t t l l l ρ ρ − + = − 1 ˆ
1 (3)
where ρ  ∈  [0,1] is the measure of insider power in wage setting. The union chooses  t w
so as to maximise (2) subject to (1) and (3). This results in the following nominal wage





t t l l p w ρ ρ − + − = − 1 1  (4)
where 
e





t t z p p l l l + − + − + = − ρ ρ 1 1 (5)
                                                          
3 Note that work that focus on employment determination as a function of firms’ labour demand and
workers’ labour supply typically use matching models to derive the equilibrium supply and demand
conditions in the labour market. It is not clear, however, how such microfoundations based on search
dynamics would be compatible with the microfoundations arising from union membership dynamics that
will be introduced below.
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e, expected inflation as π t
e=pt
e-pt-1, and unemployment as
ut=l
s-lt, (5) can be rewritten as an expectation augmented Phillips curve, directly




t t t t z u u − − − = − π π ρ 1 .( 6 )
In this set-up, one can think that the expected inflation is formed by the private sector
one period earlier, i.e., π t
e = Et-1(π t). The autoregressive term, ρ ut-1, introduces past
unemployment as a state variable, showing how the persistence in the unemployment
rate directly arises from the insider power in wage setting. Via Okun’s law, there is also
a mapping from unemployment persistence to output persistence.
4
Given the expectation-augmented Phillips curve (6) and the institutional set-up,
the policymaker chooses the rate of inflation to minimise a standard loss function that
is quadratic in both unemployment and inflation.
[]
2 2 ) (
2
1 ∗ − + = π π λ t t t u L .( 7 )
We assume that the economy’s transmission mechanism is known and such that
the policymaker can directly control the inflation rate which, in a small open economy
and under the PPP assumption, is equal to the realised rate of currency depreciation. In
(7), λ  > 0 is the relative weight assigned by the policymaker on the respective policy
objectives, and π * is the log of policymaker’s inflation target. Since the
unemployment target is assumed to equal to the long run natural rate of zero, there is no
average inflation bias in the model; however, under discretionary policy with a finite λ
the policymaker has an incentive to generate policy surprises. Under an exchange rate
                                                          
4 Ascari (2003) analyses the sources of output persistence and argues that an economy-wide union is a
rather realistic assumption when deriving output persistence. This is because in the short run, mobility
both across industries and skills tends to be limited. Castrén and Takalo (2000) endogenise output
persistence as arising from capital market frictions reflecting limited access to outside funding and the
subsequent dependence on revenue financing.
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so that π t = 0.
In practice, a binding commitment to an exchange rate peg is hardly possible.
Instead, the policymaker usually devices an escape clause that allows her to abandon
the currency peg in the aftermath of an exceptionally large output shock. Such
“partial” commitment will, however, still temper the credibility problem because it
renders the exercise of the escape clause costly. We consider a two-sided escape clause
by assuming that the policymaker places herself in a position where any upward change
in the exchange rate (a devaluation, implying that π t > 0) has a cost of cd whereas any
downward change in the exchange rate (a revaluation, implying π t < 0) has a cost of cr.
5
The timing of events is as follows. (i) The private sector rationally forms its
expectations on the future rate of depreciation, knowing the policymaker’s preference
parameter λ , inflation target π * and the realignment costs cr and cd. (ii) The output
shock is realised. (iii) The policymaker makes the realignment decision. (iv) The
optimal rate of exchange rate depreciation is determined.
3.2. Equilibrium conditions and the devaluation premium
We begin by analysing the set of actions following a decision to maintain the
currency peg. By definition, the rate of depreciation is then zero, and from (6) it is then
trivial to see that the unemployment rate equals
t
e
t t t z u u − + = − π ρ 1 .( 8 )
If the policymaker instead abandons the peg and opts for discretionary monetary policy
(floating exchange rate), the external value of the currency will be determined by
private sector expectations. In other words, the policymaker simply chooses the rate of
                                                          
5 Following the bulk of the literature on escape clauses (e.g., Obstfeld 1994, 1996, 1997, Jeanne 1999)
we regard these fixed costs as exogenous. They are usually interpreted as political costs of breaking the
commitment to the exchange rate peg (De Kock and Grilli, 1993). A deviation from the peg can also
involve a direct cost if the policymaker has issued debt denominated in foreign currency (for a related
argument, see Bohn, 1990).
14
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discretionary equilibrium, we restrict our attention to Markov-perfect equilibria where
strategies at date t depend on the past only through the payoff-relevant state variable ut-
1. Making this common restriction implies that we exclude strategies that directly
depend on the realignment decision. The policymaker’s strategy can then be expressed
as a function of ut-1, that is, the intertemporal decision problem has the following form:
[] ) ( min ) ( 1 1 t t t t u V L E u V δ
π + = − − , (9)
where δ ∈ [0,1] is the common discount factor.
When making the optimal policy decision, the policymaker takes into account
that changes in current unemployment will affect current expectations of future
inflation through V(ut). To solve (9), we employ the method of undetermined
coefficients. Because the problem is linear-quadratic, we can conjecture that the value
function takes a quadratic form
2
2 1 0 2
1
) ( u u u V γ γ γ + + = , (10)
where coefficients γ 0, γ 1, and γ 2 are to be determined later. Upon inserting (6), (7), and
(10) into the right-hand side of (9) and minimising with respect to π t, we obtain that in







* ~ 1 δγ π
π , (11)
where  t u  is given by (8) and b = λ +δγ 2. Parameter b measures the degree of
substitutability between the rate of unemployment and the rate of depreciation in the
policymaker’s value function, that is, -b = ∂
2V/∂ u∂π . This substitutability parameter is
an important component of the equilibrium analysis as several of the insights below can
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equilibrium unemployment rate under a free float is then
t t t u u π~ ~ − = , (12)
where  t u  and  t π~  are given by (8) and (11).
The policymaker’s expected per period welfare losses under the peg and under




1 ∗ + = π λ t t u L , (13a)
() [] . ~ ~
2
1 ~ 2 2 ∗ − + = π π λ t t t u L  (13b)
Note that the costs of currency realignment can be ignored at this stage. The
equilibrium intertemporal loss functions under the two regimes can now be expressed
in terms of (8), (12) and (13a, b) as
() () ) ( 1 1 t t t t u V L E u V δ + = − − , (14a)
() () . ) ~ (
~ ~ ~
1 1 t t t t u V L E u V δ + = − − . (14b)
We now turn to analyse the optimal realignment decision. Given the fixed costs of
currency realignment, cd and cr, the authorities would deviate from the exchange rate
peg only when the shock is negative and large enough so that V  - V
~ > cd, leading to a
devaluation, or positive and large enough so that V  - V
~  > cr, leading to a revaluation.
Invoking the unimprovability principle of dynamic programming, it is sufficient to
consider one-period deviations only. Consequently, we can rewrite both intertemporal
loss functions in (14a, b) by employing the same functional form given by (10):
16
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2 1 1 1 2
1
t t t t t u u L E u V γ γ δ , (15a)
() . ~
2
1 ~ ~ ~ 2












 + + = − − t t t t t u u L E u V γ γ δ (15b)
Substituting (8) and (13a) for (15a) and (12) and (13b) for (15b), the conditions V  - V
~
> cr and V  - V

























1 ) 1 ( 2 *
. (16b)
Equations (16a, b) determine the “trigger shocks” beyond which it will be optimal to
switch from the peg to a floating regime. If the shock realisations are not extreme, that
is, if zt ∈  [zd, zr], the exchange rate peg is maintained. On the other hand, a revaluation
occurs when zt > zr and devaluation occurs when zt < zd.
Assuming that the policymaker’s decision rule is fully transparent, the trigger
shocks have to be incorporated in the private sector’s rational expectations for inflation
(and depreciation). Recalling that the output shock zt is uniformly distributed on [-Z/2,
Z/2], the equilibrium expected depreciation is given by














dz z f z dz z f z E π π π . (17)
Substituting (11) for  ) ( ~ z t π  and (16a, b) for zr and zd in (17) gives, after some algebra





u b E t t t ∆
+
+ + + = − −
1
* 1 1 1 ρ δγ π π . (18)
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lower is the relative cost of devaluation. Empirically, the existence of the devaluation
premium in expectations is well documented in the form of interest rate risk premia.
However, in our case the premium is explicitly derived as a component of the private
sector inflationary expectations arising from asymmetric costs of currency re-
alignment.
6
Substituting (18) for π t
e in (11) yields the optimal rate of depreciation under the
escape clause regime:





− ∆ + + + = − 1
* * ~
1 1 ρ δγ π π . (19)
The average rate of depreciation can now be obtained by substituting (19) for  ) ( ~ z t π  in
(17). This exercise confirms that in the rational expectations equilibrium the actual
average depreciation rate equals the expected depreciation rate shown in (18).
In the usual escape clause framework (e.g. Obstfeld 1994, 1996, 1997) a co-
ordination game on the private sector can generate a self-fulfilling currency crisis. By
the same logic, in our model there can be other equilibria than the one characterised by
(16a,b), (18) and (19). Nevertheless, the range of parameter values where the self-
fulfilling crisis can occur is rather restricted. If ∆ c<0 and the expected inflation is so
high that the possibility of revaluation is ruled out, i.e., zr=Z/2, there may be another
stable equilibrium where the peg is more fragile (like in Obstfeld, 1994, 1996, 1997).
                                                          
6 The fact that the immediate relative costs of devaluation for the policymaker tend to be lower than the
costs of revaluation finds empirical support in many institutional settings regulating fixed currency
regimes. For example, Article 3 of Protocol No. 6 on the EMU convergence criteria referred to in Article
109j (1) of the Maastricht Treaty stipulates the following.  “The criterion on the participation in the
exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System… shall mean that the Member State has
respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange rate mechanism… without severe
tensions for at least the last two years before the examination. In particular, the Member State shall not
have devalued its currency’s bilateral central rate against any other Member State’s currency on its own
initiative for the same period.”
18
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focus on the equilibrium characterised by (16a,b), (18) and (19).
7  
However, even if multiple equilibria cannot be based on escape clauses, they
can still emerge from unemployment persistence. This can be seen when the model is
completed by determining the coefficients γ 1 and γ 2.
8 Since we have assumed that the
policy-maker’s unemployment target equals the long run natural rate (of zero), it turns
out that γ 1=0. But there are two Markov-perfect equilibria that give rise to different
values for γ 2. The literature on optimal monetary policy institutions under structural
rigidities provides two alternative avenues to proceed. The more straightforward way,
applied in e.g. Svensson (1997, 1999), Lockwood, Miller, and Zang (1998), Beetsma
and Jensen (1999), and Rantala (2004), is to ignore the “nonintuitive” equilibrium with
strong persistence and “perverse” comparative static properties. The second way, used,
e.g., in Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994), Lockwood (1997), and Jensen (1999) is
to consider both equilibria equally. While the second approach would certainly yield
interesting findings, we focus on the “intuitive” equilibrium with a lower level of
unemployment persistence. This equilibrium, it should be remarked, is the limit of the
unique equilibrium of the finite-horizon version of the game (see Lockwood and
Philippopoulos, 1994) and stable under least-squares learning (see Rantala, 2004). We
show in Appendix 2 that, following this approach, b can be written as
δ ρ
δ λρ δ ρ δ ρ
2
2 2 2 2
2
4 ) 1 ( 1 − − − −
= b . (20)
                                                          
7 In fact, in the two-sided escape clause model
 considered here there is a wide range of parameter values
where no other equilibria may arise from the interaction of escape clauses with private sector
expectations. For example, if ∆ c=0 the “self-fulfilling crisis” equilibria are ruled out. However, it is
beyond the scope of this study to specify the exact range of parameter values where the combination of
private sector expectations and escape clauses leads to multiple equilibria. See Jeanne (1999) for a
discussion on the role of output persistence in creating multiple equilibria in a one-sided escape clause
model.
8 Because the identification of coefficients γ 1 and γ 2 using the method of undetermined coefficients is a
rather tedious exercise, we relegate the details to Appendix 2. Equations (16a,b), (18), and (19) show
how the coefficient γ 0 is irrelevant as it affects neither the policy rules nor the market behaviour.
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2δ , i.e., it arises from the interaction of
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The macroeconomic equilibrium is now fully characterised by (20)-(21d).
4. Stability of Exchange Rate Peg in the Presence of Unemployment Persistence
When the model includes unemployment persistence, there is always the
possibility that the dynamic system does not converge to a stationary state. To avoid
such outcome we impose a stability restriction on the parameters. Substituting (21c)
into (6) shows that the stability condition dut/dut-1<1 holds only under the following
restriction.
STABILITY CONDITION: ρ  (1+b)<1.
The Stability Condition amounts to requiring that that the policymaker is sufficiently
“conservative” so that λ  is not too large or, alternatively, that ρ  is sufficiently small.
These restrictions are well supported by results in previous research. For example, the
literature following Rogoff (1985) shows that optimal delegation of monetary policy
implies choosing a monetary authority with more conservative preferences than society.
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extreme levels of persistence. Operating under this parameter restriction, we can
summarise the relevant properties and consequences of equation (20).
LEMMA 1. It follows from the Stability Condition that (i) b ≥  0, (ii) db/dρ  >0, and (iii)
dγ 2/dλ >0.
Proof: In Appendix 3.
Part (i) of Lemma 1 confirms the conjecture of the previous section, that is, that
unemployment and currency depreciation are policy substitutes. Note from part (ii) that
the degree of substitutability is increasing in unemployment persistence. The third part
shows that if the policymaker assigns a high weight on the unemployment target, she
will also care more about the long-run unemployment implications.
From (21d) we see that if the peg is abandoned, the optimal policy response to
past unemployment and output shocks is given by bρ  and -b/(1+b). Combining the
Stability Condition and Lemma 1 then yields our first result.
PROPOSITION 1. (i) If the peg is abandoned, the absolute values of optimal policy
response to past unemployment and output shocks are increasing in the level of
unemployment persistence. (ii) Under the exchange rate peg with escape clauses, the
average rate of depreciation is increasing in the devaluation premium ∆ c.
Proof. The proof directly follows from (21c), (21d) and Lemma 1.
Q.E.D
The results of part (i) are standard, as the behaviour of the optimal policy responses
reflects the message in Svensson (1997). If the economy shows unemployment
persistence, a stronger response to supply shocks is required in the current period to
avoid shocks accumulating in the future. Part (ii) warrants more attention. The
devaluation premium ∆ c is positive if the cost of devaluation is lower than the cost of
21
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 406
November 2004revaluation, since in that case the policymaker is ex ante known to be more prone to
devalue than to revalue. The devaluation premium is incorporated in expectations, as
can be seen from (21c). Hence in the case of a positive premium the policy surprises
must be relatively large to reduce unemployment. In other words, even though the rate
of depreciation is zero in the escape clause regime under small output fluctuations,
]   , [ z z zt ∈ , the average rate of depreciation will be higher due to the devaluation
premium. Therefore, an exchange rate peg with escape clauses may lead to a lower
average rate of inflation only when the policymaker is known to be relatively averse to
depreciation so that the devaluation premium is negative, i.e., ∆ c < 0. This is a clear
justification as to why prospective devaluations are seen as more harmful than
revaluations under a fixed currency regime.
We are now ready to analyse the effect of unemployment persistence on the
credibility of the exchange rate peg. Equations (21a, b) determine the range of output
shocks in which the exchange rate peg is optimally defended. As we focus on the two-
sided escape clause model, we need to ensure that the revaluation option remains
viable, which will be the case if the cost of revaluation is sufficiently low or if
sufficiently large shocks are possible.
9 For brevity, we also assume that cr = cd = c for
the remainder of the paper. Then, (21a, b) yield the following simple measure of the
credibility of the peg:




z z d r
+
= − ≡ Φ
1 2 2
.
Observe first that Φ  is increasing in the cost of currency realignment. An exogenous
reduction in the cost thus dilutes the credibility of the exchange rate peg. In addition to
the realignment cost, the credibility measure is merely a function of unemployment
persistence and the policymaker’s preferences. Proposition 2 summarises the respective
effects of these two parameters on the credibility of the exchange rate peg.
                                                          
9 The formal parameter restriction is  () () 1 1
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unemployment persistence and in the weight assigned to the unemployment objective,
i.e., dΦ /dρ  < 0, dΦ /dλ  < 0.
Proof: Because db/dρ  > 0 by part (ii) of Lemma 1, and because Definition 1 shows that
∂ Φ /∂ b < 0, the claim dΦ /dρ  < 0 follows. To see that dΦ /dλ  < 0, let us first rewrite Φ  as
()
2







. Then, the effect of λ  on Φ  can be split in two
λ
γ












From the definition of Φ  we see that the first term in the right-hand side of (22) is
negative. Because the definition of Φ  also shows that ∂ Φ /∂γ 2 is negative, and because
dγ 2/dλ >0 by part (iii) of Lemma 1, the second term in the right-hand side is also
negative.
Q.E.D
Proposition 2 yields a straightforward policy recommendation: an exchange rate
peg can be made more credible by structural reforms that reduce unemployment
persistence. The reason is that the costs of insufficient shock stabilisation increase in
the level of the persistence, because the shocks that are not stabilised in a given period
will affect future unemployment and hence the expected rate of currency depreciation.
Under such conditions even small additional shocks to output can trigger a speculative
attack that forces the policymaker to abandon the currency peg. Moreover, when the
economy is characterised by unemployment persistence, a conservative policymaker
(who shows a small λ ) is particularly credible, as she ignores both the usual short-run
unemployment effects and also the long-run unemployment considerations. This is
highlighted by equation (21) where the first and the second terms in the right-hand side
depict the short-run and the long-run credibility effects, respectively. Because of the
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thus further increasing the sustainability of the peg.
Proposition 2 also provides a comment on the debated issue of delegation of
monetary policy in the presence of unemployment persistence. Influential contributions
by Svensson (1997) and Beetsma and Jensen (1999) show that unemployment
persistence is crucial for “restoring” the argument originally put forward by Rogoff
(1985) that monetary policy should be delegated to a conservative agent who places a
greater relative weight on exchange rate stability. From the outset, Proposition 2 seems
to support this view as the credibility of the currency peg can be enhanced by
delegation. However, an excessively strong preference for exchange rate stability
means that unemployment shocks are not sufficiently stabilised, and they can
accumulate over time. As shown by Lockwood, Miller, and Zhang (1998), the
cumulative effect of the shocks can generate long run unemployment rates so severe
that the delegation becomes counterproductive. In our set-up this effect is likely to be
reinforced as the shocks are not stabilised at all when the peg is maintained. As we do
not consider inflation targeting as Svensson (1997) and Beetsma and Jensen (1999), our
view here is more similar to the Rogoff’s original argument and its “restorations” by
Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997) and Lockwood, Miller, and Zhang (1998): the cost of
increased credibility is insufficient stabilisation of the real economy. Therefore,
building on the results of Lohmann (1992) we can hypothesise that unemployment
persistence would make an exchange rate peg controlled by an independent central
bank more prone to overruling by a policymaker who has a strong preference for
unemployment stabilisation.
10 This is yet another manifestation of our key conclusion:
the only sustainable policy of enhancing the credibility of a peg is to invoke structural
reforms that reduce unemployment persistence.
                                                          
10 See Wood (2001) for discussion of this in the context of central bank constitutions.
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(a) The financial crisis in Finland in the early 1990s
Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s the Finnish economy underwent the most
volatile business cycle in the history of developed economies since the Great
Depression. Careful ex post assessment of the potential causes and consequences has
led to a conclusion that the interactions between exchange rate regimes and labour
market rigidities could have been integral to the developments (see Honkapohja and
Koskela 1999 for a detailed analysis).
The Finnish labour market has been characterised by corporatist wage-setting,
and since the early 1980s the union density has been over 80%. The harmonised wage
system that was often disconnect from developments in industry-level productivity
growth contributed from time to time to high inflation and loss of competitiveness that
gave rise to the notorious devaluation cycles.
In early 1980, amid the surge in global inflation, the exchange rate of the
Finnish markka was pegged to a basket of currencies. The currency regime was initially
successful in importing credibility to monetary policy. However, towards the end of the
1980s the exchange rate regime came under increasing pressure when the combined
effect of financial market liberalisation, relatively lax fiscal policy and very low levels
of unemployment resulted in an overheated economy. Despite the obvious inflationary
risks the possibility of enhancing the credibility of the regime through labour market
reforms did not receive sufficient support among social partners. Against the
background of the need to curb inflationary pressures, the Finnish markka was
revaluated in November 1989.
The boom of late 1980s came to an abrupt end in 1990 when the economy was
successively hit by several large shocks. The GDP growth rate declined rapidly from
over +4% in 1988 to almost -7% in 1991. The Finnish markka came under renewed
pressure, but the policy response was to uphold the strong currency regime. In an
attempt to improve credibility the markka was unilaterally pegged to the ECU in June
1991. This time around, however, the need for labour market reform was perceived.
Government made an attempt to negotiate an agreement with trade unions that would
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proceeded too slowly and ultimately the Bank of Finland ran out of currency reserves
in defending the peg. The fixed exchange rate regime was then abandoned in two
stages, with full floating ensuing in September 1992. In the event, the markka
depreciated sharply suggesting that significant pressure could have accumulated in the
economy over the past years. This chain of events made Finland a notorious example of
a collapse of a fixed currency regime and paved the way to the ERM crisis in fall 1992
(see, e.g., Dornbusch, Goldajn, and Valdès 1995).
In the absence of structural reform, the change of the exchange rate regime was
indispensable to the economic recovery that gradually commenced in 1993. However,
even if the ensuing recovery was rapid (the average annual GDP growth in 1994-2000
was 5.1%), unemployment rate soared to peak in 1994 when almost 20% of the labour
force was out of a job. The unemployment rate has remained persistently high,
declining below the 10% mark only in the early 2000s.
11
                                                          
11 The experience of large devaluation after a period of exchange rate pegging under rigid labour market
structures is to some extent not uncommon to the developments in Argentina a decade later. A major
difference was, however, that Finland did not default on its debt obligations after the collapse of the peg.
In addition, no IMF programme was subscribed to sort out the ensuing financial crisis.
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at fulfilling the EMU convergence criteria. As a part of the programme the floating of
the markka ended in October 1996 when Finland joined ERM, and after successfully
fulfilling the convergence criteria Finland became part of the euro area among the first
group of countries in January 1999. Because of the past experience, it was clear that
abandoning the floating exchange rate regime meant that the ability of the labour
markets to adjust to economic shocks should somehow be enhanced. Even under these
circumstances it turned difficult to implement any radical changes in the existing
institutions. Finally, government and trade unions agreed to establish “EMU buffer
funds”, a rather ingenious way to shelter the labour markets from the initial impact of
unfavourable shocks.
12 The merits of the buffer funds continue to be debated (see, e.g.,
Halko 2003), and their ability to stabilise employment fluctuations are yet to be tested
in practise. Nonetheless, the introduction of the buffer funds has been discussed in
other countries, especially in Sweden (see the report of the Committee on Stabilisation
Policy for Full Employment if Sweden Joins the Monetary Union, 2002).
The relative role played by shocks and institutions in the rise and persistence of
the Finnish unemployment has also been debated. For example, Nickell (1999) argues
that the changes in institutions could explain only half a percentage change in the
equilibrium unemployment rate in Finland. However, the analysis by Koskela and
Uusitalo (2003) suggests that the persistence of Finnish unemployment is difficult to
explain without interaction between shocks and institutions that, according to
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), is the driving force behind European unemployment.
The role of unemployment persistence, and labour market rigidities more general, in
increasing the vulnerability for currency crises could be tested empirically by looking
at a set of early warning indicators for a large set of countries that are categorised
according to some measure of labour market flexibility. We leave such an interesting
exercise for one obvious avenue for future work.
                                                          
12 The basic idea of the buffer funds is to stabilise the employers’ social security contributions, including
unemployment insurance, over the business cycle. During a boom unemployment insurance contributions
are kept at a higher level to collect a surplus that could then be used in a recession to compensate for the
higher need of unemployment contributions. The ultimate goal of the funds is to smooth fluctuations in
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There has been extensive discussion of a related topic – the sequence of
liberalisation in developing countries.  A good, and still up-to-date, review can be
found in a 1984 Princeton Essay in International Finance by Sebastian Edwards. To
quote:
“During the 1970s, a number of developing countries embarked on major attempts to
liberalise their economies through reforms aimed at increasing the role of the market
mechanism and reducing existing barriers to international trade and capital movements.
The most dramatic of these episodes took place in Latin America.  The main objective
of these reforms was to transform these countries into open export-oriented economies.
A decade after these reforms were first implemented, the evidence indicates that they
were to a large extent failures.”  (p1)
Edwards goes on to observe that while a major cause of these failures was the
unfavourable external environment of the time:
“These recent experiences also indicate that a number of issues relating to the dynamics
of  the liberalisation are not well understood. The most important of these relates to the
speed and order of economic liberalisation”. (p2).
As he correctly points out, one would wish to liberalise everything at once.  But
in a world with “externalities or distortions” (p2) and, which he does not include,
political and social constraints, this may well not be possible.
That last observation has led to an extensive literature on the order of reform
most appropriate for making the liberalisation successful. One aspect of this focuses on
the problems of opening the capital account (of the balance of payments) while the
domestic capital market is still repressed (e.g., McKinnon, 1973, 1982; Dornbusch,
1983, 1984). After studying the problems that result from such “premature” capital
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should follow domestic financial market liberalisation to avoid destabilisation through
large capital inflows.  In  his  controversial account of the prospective merits of
globalisation, Stiglitz (2002) makes a powerful case for sequencing of reforms:
“The [economic] theory says that an efficient market economy requires that all of the
assumptions [underlying Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”] be satisfied. In some cases,
reforms in one area, without accompanying reforms in others, may actually make
matters worse. This is the issue of sequencing… economic theory and history show
how disastrous it can be to ignore sequencing”.
Although the focus of these issues is somewhat different from those in our
model above, the underlying problem addressed is the same: what has to be done
domestically to ensure the success of reforms in which the relationship to the rest of the
world changes.  A similar analysis to that in the present paper could address these
developing country problems. This is highlighted by Edwards’ (1984) concluding
observations:
“If the public perceives the policies to be inconsistent, it will expect the reform attempt
to be discontinued or reversed.  In that sense, even more important than determining the
correct order of liberalisation may be defining a consistent and credible policy package
that will support whichever order is chosen.”
That is plainly relevant to the issues we have discussed.
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In a world with adjustment costs, externalities, and political and social
constraints on policy regime changes, the order of carrying out the steps of a regime
change can be important for both welfare and for the success of the changes. The
wrong order may result in political or economic pressures which impede, halt, or even
reverse the changes.
There is an extensive literature which discusses aspects of this in the context of
developing countries. But there have been no generalisations of this literature, and little
recognition of its relevance to policy regime changes (or adjustments) in economies
with more developed institutional structures. This paper formalises the general question
in this literature and provides a general answer which, as it turns out, underpins earlier
work.
We augment the two-sided escape clause model developed by Obstfeld (1996)
by incorporating labour market rigidities as in Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994).
Such rigidities are shown to generate output persistence in the face of shocks. We show
that structural measures that successfully curb this persistence can reduce risk premia
and enhance the credibility of stabilisation programmes based on exchange rate
pegging. Our finding has clear implications for the sequence of reform as a more
flexible labour market is shown to be paramount to increasing credibility of fixed
exchange rate regimes. Such implications could be clearer for developed countries than
for the much more frequently discussed developing countries case, for labour market
rigidities are seldom regarded as a typical problem in the latter group. It also bears on
the issue of “excessive conservatism” with regard to inflation; that can undermine the
low-inflation policy commitment in the absence of structural reform. Here, too,
reducing labour market rigidities proves to be beneficial.
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November 2004Appendix 1: Derivation of equation (18)
Because  t z  uniformly distributed on [-Z/2, Z/2], we can rewrite (17) as
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where  1 ˆ δγ π π + ≡
∗ . After simplifying (A1.2) we get
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Recalling that  1 ˆ δγ π π + ≡
∗ ,  () r c b R + ≡ 1 2  and  () d c b D + ≡ 1 2  (A1.4) can be re-
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1 ρ δγ π π , which is equivalent to (18).
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November 2004Appendix 2: Determining coefficients γ 1 and γ 2
Let us write the recursive value functions explicitly as
2
2 1 0 2
1
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where bt = λ +δγ 2t. After using (6), (18), and taking the expectations (A2.3) simplifies to
() ( ) t t t t t t t u b b u 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 δγ ρ ρ γ γ + + = + − − − − ,( A 2 . 4 )
Note that because of the envelope theorem, we do not have to take account the effect of
ut-1 on π t in deriving (A2.4) from (A2.2). Equation (A2.4) has a solution only if
() t t t b 1 1 1 1 δγ ρ γ + = − (A2.5)
and
() t t t b b + = − 1
2
1 2 ρ γ .( A 2 . 6 )
In the stationary state γ it-1=  γ it  =  γ i for i  ∈ {1, 2} and, accordingly, bt=b. After
manipulating (A2.6) in the stationary state, the implicit solution for γ 2 can be expressed
in terms of b as
() 0 1
2 2 2 = + − − λ δρ δρ b b .( A 2 . 7 )
Equation (A2.7) has two positive solutions but, for the reasons given in the main text,
we exclude the larger root. Solving (A2.7) for the smaller root gives
2
2 2 2 2
2
4 ) 1 ( 1
δρ
λδρ δρ δρ − − − −
= b ,( A 2 . 8 )
which corresponds (21).
Given (A2.8), we immediately see that the only generic solution for (A2.5) is
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i) We prove that the Stability Condition is a sufficient condition that b has a positive
real solution. The Stability Condition is equivalent to ρ (1+b)< 1 or, by using (A2.8), to
ρδ
δ λρ δ ρ δ ρ
ρ
2
4 ) 1 ( 1
1
2 2 2 2 − − − −
> − .( A 3 . 1 )
Simplifying and rearranging (A3.1) gives
() ρδ ρ δ ρ δ λρ δ ρ 2 1 1 4 ) 1 (
2 2 2 2 − − − > − − .( A 3 . 2 )
Clearly, if the right-hand side is positive, the left-hand side also has to be positive.
After some manipulation, the right-hand side of (A3.2) turns out to be equivalent to
() ( ) 0 1 1
2 2 > − + − δ δ ρ ρδ .( A 3 . 3 )
which clearly holds. Thus the left-hand side of (A3.2) has a positive real-solution, if the
Stability condition holds. From (A2.8) we can then confirm that if the left-hand side of
(A3.2) has a positive real solution, b has a positive real solution, too.
Q.E.D
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2δ  captures the impact of unemployment persistence on b. Differentiating
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Equation (A3.5) is positive if the term in the square-brackets is positive, i.e., if
() 0 4 ) 1 ( 2 1 4 ) 1 (
2 2 > − − + + − + − − − h h h h h h λ λ λ .( A 3 . 6 )
Simplifying and rearranging (A3.6) gives
h h h h λ λ 4 ) 1 ( 2 1
2 − − > − − .( A 3 . 7 )
Rewriting the right-hand side of (A3.7) yields
() λ λ λ λ + − − − > − − 1 4 ) 2 1 ( 2 1
2 2 h h h h h .( A 3 . 8 )
Q.E.D
iii) Because b=λ +δγ 2, (A3.4) can be rewritten as
36
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 406
November 20040
2
4 ) 1 ( 1
2
2 =
− − − −
− +
h
h h h λ
δγ λ .( A 3 . 9 )
Differentiating (A3.9) with respect to γ 2 and λ  gives
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